Despre Biserică, și nu numai

By Modeste Schwartz, French author living in Transylvania, Romania.

If you follow the mainstream narrative, right wing parties have ruled Romania most of the time since 2004. As to what “right wing parties” might possibly refer to in the neo-colonial situation of post-1990 Romania, this is, of course, a carefully avoided question.

What could the “right” possibly mean in a country where Occidentalism is de facto the only ideology of the diverse party-like conglomerates opposing the Social-Democrat Party (PSD), heir to the former one-party system of N. Ceaușescu? As a matter of fact, so-called “right-wing politics” in Romania began exactly at the point where Western-European conservative parties ended before their final defeat: in total oblivion of sovereignty, national pride and traditional values. The economics of “right-wing parties” in Romania are equal to underwriting whatever neo-liberal policies come posted from Brussels. Their social policies mean blind acceptance of any cultural revolution proposed by the Soros galaxy and its LGBT stooges. And their foreign policy consists of demonizing Russia to the exact extent required by NATO circles, even more so than countries (otherwise loyal NATO-allies) such as Hungary or France.

In such conditions, interpreting the imperial come-back of the PSD last December as a “turn to the left” might be true as far as fiscal and redistribution policies are concerned, but totally misses the essence of what is happening under our very eyes in Romania. Indeed, Romanian voters not only shunned the governing “liberal” party of president Johannis, not only did they bring back to power the PSD ruled by L. Dragnea (who, though a “socialist leader”, famously said last fall that he considered that “family has to be defined as the alliance of a man and a woman”) – they also largely rejected most of the right- and left-wing ideologies which dominate the media spectrum in present-day Europe. Test-balloon “nationalist” parties such as the Alianța Noastră, which tried to capitalize politically on Orthodoxy, or the xenophobic Party of United Romania (PRU), which rather endeavoured to scapegoat the Hungarian minority, did not even reach the representation-threshold, while the Soros-supported ultra-liberal USR (a strange, Ukraine-like combination of nationalists and “social justice warriors”), in spite of massive media support, barely reached 10%.

Beyond “right” and “left”, the come-back of PSD in Romania really means that the country is finally returning to normality. Romanians (though not massively participating in the elections) returned to power the only party – call it “right” or “left”, you’ll be wrong either way – which actually represents their nation, with its ample network of local offices and representatives, generally the only ones with a real presence in rural Romania. The still-born USR, with its 10%, is the true reflection of the only kind of bourgeoisie Romania ever had since the fall of N. Ceaușescu: a typical compradores-bourgeoisie, feeding on NGOs financed by the West, on the extractive activities of Western multinational corporations and on the devastating brain-drain which turns the country into a ghetto for those unable to emigrate (elderly and under-qualified people, peasants, Gypsies). This bourgeoisie, unlike the Hungarian bourgeoisie, is unlikely to ever become the basis of a patriotic movement, since its class interests are totally opposed to those of the popular layers surviving under the economical oppression of the very Western European states who financed the emergence of USR. As for former president T. Băsescu, once the leader of the Romanian “Orange Revolution”, his party also finished beneath the representation-threshold. (n.m.: aici se pare că este o eroare – PMP, cu tot cu TB, a intrat, la limită, în parlament)

Thus, interpreting the rejection by president Johannis of Mrs. Sevil Shhaideh, a PSD MP from the Turkish-speaking minority of Dobrogea, who was the PSD’s first Prime-Minister proposal, as “the Romanian right fighting back against multi-culturalism” is totally erroneous. As a matter of fact, in a country where Orthodox Christians represent 80% of the population (and close to 90% of the Romanian-speaking population), Johannis himself, hero of the “Romanian right”, was, as a member of the small Lutheran Saxon minority, the biggest slap to the face ever inflicted upon Romanian national pride by the globalist elites. Hence, viewing his (otherwise anti-constitutional) refusal as some kind of defence of “Christian Europe” against “imposed diversity” is quite a ludicrous idea. If motivated by anything other than illegal opposition to a democratic process, his refusal was most probably (though not officially) linked to the personality of Shhaideh’s husband, a pro-Assad Syrian citizen. Johannis and his “technocratic” (eurocratic) government, by the way, enjoyed the support of USR, in which most party leaders are members of national minorities, or even immigrants, such as the very popular Clotilde Armand – a French-Romanian woman who unsuccessfully ran for mayor in Bucharest last year.

Those willing at any price to categorize the now ruling PSD in accordance with Western political denominations will have a hard time doing so. PSD is a broad alliance typical of Third-World countries, including all kinds of political sensibilities, from outright globalist/feminist liberals such as Euro-MP Corina Crețu to former national-communist Olguța Vasilescu (a former member of the Great Romania Party lead by the late Vadim Tudor), but also a lot of more or less apolitical, more or less corrupt, but also very often honest and dedicated local representatives, mainly characterized by the family values and (Orthodox Christian) religious views of rural Romania.

Compared to this ideologically rather undefined, but socially and culturally homogeneous, organic party, the so-called “right wing parties” in Romania – which tend to switch names and slogans before every election and to recompose every six months in the wake of newer and newer scandals – have only a few things in common, and those things hardly qualify for elements of a bona fide “conservative” identity: they are socially anchored in big cities, and propagate a clearly anti-popular and anti-national discourse, based on portraying rural Romanians pretty much the way leftist politicians and mainstream media in Western Europe see Marine Le Pen’s voters or the Brits who voted for BREXIT: as illiterate, “deplorable” rednecks, wife-beaters and bigots. Strangely enough (though this detail can hardly surprise those familiar with the Ukrainian post-Maidan nightmare), this utterly anti-national “right” is also home to some bona fide neo-Nazis, such as those coagulating around the website În linia dreaptă – a shameful alliance to which Western sponsors of the “Romanian right”, however, turn a blind eye, due to the conveniently Russo-phobic rhetoric of such circles.

To sum up, one might say that PSD, corrupt and amorphous as it is, remains the party of the real Romania, while the so-called “Romanian right” is a miscellanea of all globalist ideologies available on the European political market, from the LGBT crusaders to those cultivating the nostalgia of Operation Barbarossa.

Thus, though the December elections did not bring new forces to power, and failed to create renewed interest of the masses for Romanian political life, they are still a very true local echo to what happened in the UK and the USA, but also in Bulgaria and Moldova in 2016: by returning PSD to power, Romanian voters expressed a clear rejection of the so-called “Euro-Atlantic values” which Romanian mainstream media have been using for more than 20 years as an omnibus excuse for deindustrialization, massive unemployment, neo-colonial resource-grabbing and the devastating brain drain in favor of Western countries (Romania is the only peaceful country constantly losing more of its population to emigration than does war-ridden Syria …).

One might of course wonder whether the PSD leaders themselves are aware of the historical importance of the mandate their party received from the nation last December. If so, then, in the view of their angelic patience when confronted with president Johannis’ anti-constitutional provocations (which would have motivated an impeachment process in any respectable democracy), one might also wonder how independent the apparent rulers of Romania are, in the context of the constant blackmailing organized by the CIA-run “anti-corruption tribunal”, in tight collaboration with the (Berlin and Washington-driven) omnipotent secret services.

As for Johannis himself, he represents a quite close local equivalent to the Obama phenomenon in the US: two years before he became, as a last-moment surprise, the presidential candidate of “the right”, Johannis was still a complete unknown to most Romanian voters, who might, in the best case scenario, have heard his name mentioned once or twice in their life, while listening to some radio show on the Saxon minority or on tourism in Transylvania. By that time, he was only the mayor of the city of Sibiu, a picturesque and touristic province town in Transylvania, originally built and inhabited by members of the Saxon minority, but nowadays by over 90% ethnical Romanian, where he was re-elected several times with so-called North-Korean majorities. An almost unanimous press praised his “flawless managing” of the city – without dwelling too much on how could any mayor’s managing have been less than flawless as long as that mayor is sitting on a money-pipeline which spits fresh euros from Germany and Luxemburg by the millions every day. Berlin, indeed, already seemed to have big plans for this son-in-law of a former general of Ceaușescu’s secret police, who, as a mayor, was also suspected of trafficking children to the West. In the middle of a country literally shaven of it’s wonderful mountain forests by the Austrian wood tycoon Schweighoffer, the history of poster child Johannis doing God’s work with Merkel’s money is, indeed, quite exemplary.

In spite of severe suspicions of electoral fraud (feeding on a totally outdated electoral census), his election to the presidency, as every new success of the “Romanian right”, was celebrated as the final victory over “communism” – which seemingly gave him the subjective right to overlook democratic procedures, and, though having no majority in Parliament, to name a “technocratic government” of his own choice to replace V. Ponta’s legitimate government, forced to resign by “spontaneous” street agitation following a horrific tragedy – caused by a suspicious fire – in a Bucharest nightclub.

Last December, however, after two years of political clumsiness and of high-hat laconism slowly getting on the nerves of the Romanian public, and a massive PSD-victory, Johannis could evoke no hipster flambée to justify his a priori refusal to name PSD leader Dragnea to the Prime Minister’s office. His only excuse was that Dragnea, just like former French candidate for president Alain Juppé, had been previously sentenced by a court. The PSD leadership cleverly dodged the punch, proposing, instead of Dragnea, an even more multicultural and politically correct candidate than Johannis himself: Muslim woman Sevil Shhaideh. Refusing her not only cost Johannis a lot of his PC credentials, but also left him with no recourse when faced with PSD’s second proposal, since, by law, he was not allowed to refuse more than one proposal – a second refusal would have triggered the dissolution of parliament (n.m.: cred că aici MS greșește – pentru dizolvarea Parlamentului este necesar ca Parlamentul să refuze de două ori validarea guvernului propus) and a major political crisis which could have taken from his Liberal National Party even the modest 20% it was still able to harvest in December.

The second proposal was Sorin Grindeanu, a mathematician with alleged ties to the Romanian “intelligence community”, but no court antecedents and a good CV.

Possibly left holding the bag by his Western middle-management still overburdened with calculating the consequences of the Trump-tsunami, Johannis, confronted with the second proposal a few days after Christmas, decided to leave office even before the end of the week and went home to Sibiu to celebrate New Year’s Eve with his wife (and no children), postponing his answer to the first days of 2017. Even citizens who voted for him in 2014 could hardly believe their eyes when they saw their Saxon urban mascot treating the Romanian constitution as a Mississippi cotton-farmer of the 19^th century would have reacted to some social unrest among his negro slaves. They started filling social media with angry and/or ironic messages, and Johannis, officially on holidays but apparently still connected, finally lost his temper and changed his mind. And, since he had no official channel at his disposal to communicate his decision, he simply… texted Grindeanu a laconic SMS, faking fair play and familiarity. The message read: “Success! KWJ” (for: Klaus Werner Johannis). As the legend goes, Grindeanu, who did not have Johannis’ number stored in his phone, asked Dragnea what that message could possibly mean, and Dragnea, still holding a grudge on Johannis, quickly leaked the story. Ever since, Romania has become one big joke festival about the Saxon’s SMS: Facebook is full of crowdfunding initiatives to pay the president’s phone bills, so that he can afford to call people instead of messaging them, etc..

In the meantime, details emerged, which might a posteriori lead us to see less clumsiness, but much more cynical shrewdness, in Johannis’ apparently psychotic behavior. Indeed, while their highly civilized but short-worded president seemingly hesitated, travelled in search of lost time and tapped his way into history on a smartphone keyboard, PM Cioloș and his “technocratic” government lost no time, making the best and most technocratic use they could possibly make of the delay Johannis’ clumsiness bought them: funnelling the last remnants of autochthonous industry to Western “investors”, signing unsustainable funding for NATO – for which the new government, unless it goes full-on revolutionary, will have to find money somewhere, borrowing unnecessarily from the World Bank (which, for some reason, is paying former EU-commissar Cioloș an extra salary), and, all in all, leaving a 10 billion euro gap in the state’s budget.

Anxious not to sink too quickly back into the oblivion he should have never left, Johannis, however, came back to work as brazen as ever, and made sure he did not miss the next occasion to trample the constitution, by cracking jokes at the new government during the investiture ceremony, suggesting that it would be all too dependent on Dragnea’s will – in other words: that the new government is (horresco referens) at risk to respect the will of the party democratically elected by the people to rule the country – instead of guiding its steps according to the Washington consensus, the sacred rules of “technocracy” and … the pure Aryan blood of Romania’s dear Gauleiter.

La fel, este interesant articolul lui MS prilejuit de “protestele” din feb 2017 – “Romania: Revolt, indeed. But whose revolt and against who?” (de citit, cu luare-aminte, și comentariile, care întregesc imaginea):

To eliminate from the outset any simplistic polemics: yes, a sizable portion of the political staff of the Romanian Social Democratic Party (in power since last December, in the form of the Grindeanu government) is “corrupt” – meaning: they are guilty of taking bribes, abuse of public funds, etc.) as is the entire Romanian political class – without exception! –, and as indeed is (as the Fillon affair now demonstrates) nearly the entirety of European political class. The self-proclaimed captain of the “crusade against corruption” that the European media is currently seeking to frame as a “youth revolution”, the 57-year-old Klaus Johannis (president of Romania), prior to his entry into politics, was a high school physics teacher in his hometown of Sibiu. At that time, a high school teacher in Romania earned less than 300 € / month. This same Johannis (of which evil tongues whisper that he would be the son-in-law of a former high-ranking officer of the communist secret police) owns seven houses in Sibiu (a prosperous tourist town, beautifully restored, where real estate prices are at a premium) and declared, while somehow keeping a straight face, having purchased them on income (otherwise undeclared …) he received from giving private lessons!

As for the new party “United we Save Romania” (USR), which presents itself as the great generational and cultural alternative (unfortunately, totally devoid of any real political program outside the famous “anti-corruption” mysticism), its charismatic leader, the French woman (married to a Romanian) Clotilde Armand, recently stated that she “regrets” having pocketed vast funds “for advisory activities” from the multinational Bechtel corporation, which built in Transylvania one of the shortest and most expensive highways in the history of construction.

Consequently, assuming that Romanians emerge from the political apathy which remains their majority attitude, one would expect “non-political” protests, demanding such changes as amending the constitution, a complete replacement of political personnel, direct democracy, or whatever. This is not the case: the 50,000 protesting “Romanian youth” (official figure, probably overestimated – but, would it be true: the government in place owes its legitimacy to … 4 million ballots – amounting to 80 voters for one protester …) demand explicitly, and increasingly violently and illegally, the fall (and even the banning) of the PSD; as for the alternative in power they are thinking of (during those incredibly rare occasions in which they do actually think), the presence in the ranks of the demonstrators of President Johannis (initially brought to power by the National Liberal Party – PNL, now the main party of the opposition) and USR leaders leaves little room for doubt. The “young, handsome, and free” (according to their own rhetoric) want to replace a corrupt political staff backed by a strong democratic majority by a corrupt political staff with barely any democratic base whatsoever. How can one begin to explain such dementia?

Given that:

1. Many of the protesters are indeed relatively young, deprived of historical awareness and socioeconomic knowledge by the shipwreck of the Romanian (and European) school system and merely follow alpha males and females from their associative surroundings to protests they often experience as street festivals, and which also provide them a golden opportunity to socialize, flirt etc.; and
2. Another portion of the demonstrators are NGO activists funded by the organizations of the Soros Galaxy and the political foundations that execute the dirty works of German diplomacy in Eastern Europe,

We see that the above question must be split in two, leading to the description of two sets of motivations:

1. With regard to sincere demonstrators: what can lead a significant fraction of a given age group to the degree of social masochism and self-hatred that drives a student to desire to overthrow the government that has just provided him with free use of the national train system, a future employee to demonstrate against the power that increased the base salary after a decade of austerity under the umbrella of IMF-Berlin, etc.? Why do Romanians hate themselves, and each other, that much?
2. Regarding the instigators, and especially their sponsors (i.e. primarily Germany and “Brussels”): why so much hatred? Why are they trying so desperately to bring down the Grindeanu government and the party led by L. Dragnea, at all costs, even though Trump’s victory seems to have deprived them of the secret ingredient (namely the discreet interventions of the secret services under CIA control) which, up until now, ensured the political success of street movements which, in Paris or London, would literally go unnoticed (being, as they are, so marginal and politically amorphous)? Why launch all their troops from the “civil society” in this uncertain battle, at the risk of permanently discrediting them in the event of failure, even though the PSD (which could have repeatedly launched a suspension procedure against Dragnea – and has not done so) seems to be willing to fight with their hands tied, or even to peacefully negotiate?

To answer the first question would require a short treatise on the history and anthropology of Romania, which I shall try to summarize in a later article. For the time being, let us confine ourselves to a very general conclusion: born and raised in a de facto colony where their political behavior (by vote or demonstration) has never had the slightest impact on the real conduct of their country and/or their living conditions, young Romanians literally do not know what politics is, and drool like Pavlov’s dogs to the provocations of professional civil society agitators to participate in these tribal rites of collective purification branded as anti-corruption street festivals.

Answering the second question, on the other hand, requires much less intuition, interpretation, concepts, and philosophy. Indeed, it is sufficient to be informed of the recent steps taken by the Grindeanu government, and of the program of government which it intends to implement in the coming months (which are all in the public domain, but carefully ignored by the Western-controlled Romanian press and almost all of the foreign press) to understand that the Reich-Chancellor Merkel simply cannot accept such a mutiny, or even condescend to negotiate with the mutineers, but requires exemplary punishment – if necessary, according to the methods tested in Kiev.

The Grindeanu government, before adopting those amnesty decrees (objects of much whining to the “young, handsome, and free”) which, contrary to what one reads here and there in the controlled press

1. were by no means its first measure (see below),
2. do not “legalize corruption” and do not exonerate all acts of corruption (they only institute a threshold of roughly 40,000€, and it seems, in particular, that the charges held against L. Dragnea are not covered by the amnesty) and
3. were absolutely necessary – since the PSD would be completely unable to govern with the gun of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (entirely following orders of its Western sponsors) pointed at their collective head,

the Grindeanu government, during the ten days that separated its recent inauguration from the passing of said decrees, did not rest. During this period of just over a week, it has taken significant measures, including:

1. raising the level of the minimum wage and retirement benefits, thereby nullifying the austerity measures adopted by the governments of the Băsescu presidency (notably the Boc government) under the diktats of the IMF, Berlin, and Brussels; and
2. announcing a tax exemption for wages of less than € 500 (yes: a month ago in Romania, an EU member state, many employees still paid taxes on wages of € 300 in cities where the rent of a room in a shared flat rarely costs less than 100 € – food prices in supermarkets being roughly at Hungarian levels, i.e. not far from those in Austria).

Not only do these two measures “set a bad example” for all southern and eastern European countries feeling the temptation to shake off the yoke of German ordo-liberalism and to turn to growth policies, but they directly affect the German capital. Germany (i.e. the Bavarian capital and its Austrian auxiliaries) has recently become the main external investor in Romania, followed by France, while the United States (still very present in the early 2000s) seemed, from the presidency of Obama and his Asia Pivot, to be passing the button. The high profitability of these investments (Romanian companies generally presenting a double rate of profit compared to the euro zone average) is mainly based on the unrestrained exploitation of a slave labor force (with a minimum wage precisely calculated in such a way as to allow the miserable survival of an individual without a family and with no rent to pay – the Romanians being, as most Eastern Europeans, usually owners of an apartment in poor condition redeemed from the state at the beginning of the 1990s), resulting in very low social and geographical mobility, an unprecedented demographic decline and the highest emigration rate of non-African countries in the world (higher than that of Syria – including the war period!).

So far, however, I think it would have stayed in the field of the negotiable: some tax gifts to the big German “investors” (like E.on Ruhrgas, who took control of the former state gas monopoly in Transylvania, charging German gas prices to the population for the gas it buys cheap… from Russia), and Munich would have calmed down, leaving as always the small fish and the French investors to pay the expenses of the new policy (the French, however, very present in retail, would not complain too loudly about Grindeanu seeking to add steroids to the purchasing power of the Romanian middle class …).

But here’s the thing: the odious PSD government also plans to create:

• a Sovereign Development and Investment Fund (FSDI), such as in Norway, France, Saudi Arabia, etc., which would be fed by the profits of enterprises which remained under state ownership (profits? – this sounds so strange, given that previous governments have claimed that these were “bottomless holes” that should be urgently privatized …), and would serve in particular to endow Romania with the agribusiness links (processing, canning, bottling) it lacks between its enormous agricultural fertility and an internal market of 18 million consumers mostly convinced (rightly) that food produced in Romania is both healthier and more palatable than imported food.

Here, from the point of view of the colonial metropolis, one enters the domain of the non-negotiable. By such a measure, Romania simply plans to unilaterally challenge the status of an extractive colony (source of practically free raw materials and inexpensive migrant labor) assigned to it in the present world order, claiming – if not complete sovereignty, of which it does not have the military means – the status of a productive colony comparable to that of Hungary (where the average wage is about 50% higher, and which suffers less population bleeding to migration).

Thus, here’s who’s revolting right now: Germany, as a colonial metropolis, is revolting against the democratically elected government of Romania (regardless of its numerous charges of corruption – no more and no less than the previous ones or the following ones, or, indeed, those of Europe at large) and seeking to overthrow it by means of a putsch uniting the efforts of the German political foundations (F. Adenauer, F. Ebert, R. Luxemburg) with those of the Soros-financed “civil society” – which, this time , does not even bother to pretend to be apolitical or “trans-partisan”, brazenly calling to call back the government of former European Commissioner Dacian Cioloş, a “technocrat” never elected by anybody, imposed without a parliamentary majority by Johannis in 2014 as the result of a previous Bucharest “maidan”, and which has just been dismissed from power by a massive vote condemning its policy of the previous two years.

It must be said that the EU, now so vehement in its praise, had not facilitated Cioloş’s task: considering that it now controlled its Romanian plantation directly, the colonial metropolis had even decided to cut back a little more, as a result of which Cioloş’s record on the absorption of structural funds, for example, was even more catastrophic than the (notably bad) one of the previous governments. Here is the competent and virginal elite that the “young, handsome, and free” of A. Merkel and G. Soros are currently attempting to restore to power, in defiance of the popular vote. In the light of such developments, we can now consider as completed the EU’s transition (in its aims and methods) to a parasitic structure comparable to the infamous United Fruit Company in Latin America before the neo-Bolivarian revolutions. Death squads are not yet on the scene, but keep up the good work, Mr. Johannis: with effort, you can still become another Pinochet!

Modeste Schwartz

Interesant de remarcat cum, în partea de comentarii de pe oricare blog românesc, există o avalanșă, care îneacă orice contribuție la temă, de postări legionaroide, imagine vie a rezultatelor practice ale reeducării conform modelului “experimentul Pitești”. De exemplu postarea de pe blogul lui Ion Cristoiu. De comparat, în acest sens, cu comentariile de pe bloguri ne-românești (vezi exemple în blog-roll). Desigur, este important, mai ales din această cauză, ca partea de comentarii să fie “moderată”. Lipsa “moderatorului”, precum și emigrația masivă de după 1989, duce la rezultate similare cu blogurile românești și în alte locuri, unde nu te-ai aștepta.