Sau Coșmaruri. Sau Coșmarul.
RI, despre imposibilitate. (memorare)
Disputes go on about everything: which territories should be annexed to Russia, and which “did not deserve” to be annexed, which social groups in Ukraine should be subjected to defeat in their rights, and how these groups should be determined to whom and how to give (not give) Russian citizenship, etc. Sometimes you even want to paint a picture “Ivan the Terrible and his boyars decide whether the Astrakhan Khanate deserves to join Moscow.”
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In the end, as the behavior of the population of the liberated territories shows, mass active resistance to the Russian government is not to be expected. Those who do not accept Russia try to emigrate, most of the population calmly changes “banderovka” to “Budenovka”, ties St. George’s ribbons, lines up for humanitarian aid and readily listens to the stories of the few surviving pro-Russian activists about what kind of breaks and benefits Moscow will give in comparison with Kiev.
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there is no mafia that a strong and determined state could not grind
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The fact that these territories were once independent and even fought a war with Russia will be remembered only by specialists-historians, as already under Ivan the Terrible, most of the Russian population did not remember the deadly feud between Moscow and Tver
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It has happened before that a Russian soldier reached Paris, and the All-Russian emperor temporarily became the master of Europe. But at that time, no one doubted the subjectivity of European states, their ability, after the departure of the Russian troops, to normal independent existence, to build a foreign policy adequate to national interests, and in general to a full-fledged sovereign existence.
Even after the Second World War, the destroyed Europe did not completely lose its subjectivity. Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania were dissidents in the Soviet camp. The Czechs and Hungarians were even honored with the entry of Soviet troops. France de Gaulle played the role of enfant terrible in the NATO bloc, whose military organization left in 1966 (the process was launched back in 1959 by the withdrawal of the French fleet and the country’s air defense system from NATO command). Willy Brandt’s Germany successfully defended its economic interests from American encroachments. Austria and Finland enjoyed the benefits of permanent neutrality.
Now the situation has changed radically. In the 1990s, Europe finally abandoned its independent foreign and military policy in favor of the United States. Against the background of the absence of visible threats, this seemed right to Europeans and saved huge funds for national economies. But after thirty years of a “warm bath”, European political elites have finally lost the habit of making independent decisions. As a result, the EU has engaged in an anti-Russian campaign contrary to its economic and political interests.
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the Europeans followed in the wake of American foreign policy with a tenacity worthy of a better application. In this respect, they are remarkably similar to the Ukrainians who happily go to the slaughter for the sake of American interests.
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The main result of defeating the West will be that the United States will be forced to withdraw from Europe. But, as already mentioned, Europe cannot exist independently.
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With the departure of the United States, Europe turns out to be a political wasteland, a zone of permanent destabilization and military conflicts. A kind of big multinational “Ukraine”, with nuclear weapons.
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Russia is not able to offer Europe either a “Marshal’s plan” or even an occupation. Russia’s resources are limited and most of them will be spent on the reintegration of the liberated territories.
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Most likely, Moscow will try to solve the problem of deinfantilization of ownerless Europe in its traditional style-by supporting more or less adequate parties and politicians capable of taking responsibility, building informal relations with them, and extrapolating the main elements of the Russian political system to Europe. It worked in the Crimea, in the Donbas, and works in the liberated territories.
Will it work in Europe? Is unknown. In this case, cultural, historical and other differences are much more significant. In addition, so far in Ukraine we are dealing with relatively small territories and a limited number of people. So in any case, the European problem will be much more complicated and will drag on for a longer period of time.
But it will have to be solved. At least for reasons of ensuring Russia’s military security and economic interests.