Comisia de la Veneția

Toată “presa” este plină de aceeași manipulare ordinară: cum că, dacă nu respectăm indicațiile “comisiei”, vom fi aruncați afară din Europa! Iată, de exemplu, revista22. Citat este raportul “comisiei”. Zice la II.7:

The opinion has been prepared on the basis of the English translation of the draft laws provided by the Presidential Administration of Romania. Inaccuracies may occur due to the translation

Prin urmare discuția este despre niște discuții despre care cineva ne-a “tradus” că se discută în discuție. Inevitabil, ca ‘totdeauna când aud că discutăm despre o “translation”, îmi vine în minte (excelentul) film al Sofiei Coppola, Lost in Translation. Ce este important, este că “traducerea” este oferită de Administrația Prezidențială  din România. “So much for the objectivity”, cum se zice (în traducere). Zice la V.B.2.a.i.42, despre numirea în domeniul judecătorilor:

To sum up, the Venice Commission welcomes the exclusive role of the SCM in the appointment and revocation of judges, excluding the President from this procedure.

Apoi zice la V.B.2.a.ii.58:

The Constitutional Court based (24) its decision on Article 132 (1) of the Constitution (“ Public prosecutors shall carry out their activity in accordance with the principle of legality, impartiality and hierarchical control, under the authority of the Minister of Justice”), in relation to Article 94(c) of the Constitution, stating that the President has, inter alia, “to make appointments to public offices, under the terms provided by law”. To strengthen the independence of the prosecution service and individual prosecutors, one key measure would therefore be to revise, in the context of a future revision of the Romanian Constitution, the provisions of Article 132 (1) of the Romanian Constitution. At the legislative level, it could be considered, as far as dismissal is concerned, to amend Law no. 303 in such a way as to give to the opinion of the SCM a binding force.

Mai departe, la V.B.2.b.60:

The Venice Commission acknowledges that there are no common standards requiring more independence of the prosecution system, and that “a plurality of models exist” in this field. However, only a few of the Council of Europe member states have a prosecutor’s office under the executive authority and subordinated to the Ministry of Justice (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands) and “a widespread tendency to allow for a more independent prosecutor’s office, rather than one subordinated or linked to the executive” may be observed.

Este interesant cum cele doar câteva țări sunt printre cele mai europene. LOL!

Și, ca să ne distrăm mai complet, la V.B.2.b.67:

Specifically, with respect to Romania, the Venice Commission has, on the contrary, underlined the need to increase independence of the  prosecutors.

Adică, da, e ok ca procurorii, în unele state, europene, să fie sub coordonarea ministrului justiției, adică executivului; dar, desigur, nu pentru căței. LOL!

Și, în sfârșit, venim și la protocoale. Zice, la V.B.2.e.90 că, sigur, ar putea fi niște îngrijorări:

Concerns over the (unlawful) involvement of the Romanian secret intelligence agencies, in the judiciary, have been a prominent subject in the public debate, in recent years, raising questions and controversy around the independent functioning of the Romanian judiciary and the necessary guarantees to combat such interference.

La V.B.2.e.95 aflăm că, fără îndoială, există condiții obiective:

According to explanations provided to the Venice Commission delegation, the above support was justified by legal and technical imperatives linked to the enforcement of special investigation measures in complex corruption cases, the intelligence service having been, until the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2016, the only authority technically equipped for such measures and legally authorised to use the concerned technical means. At the same time, criticising the involvement of the intelligence services is seen by some stakeholders (including prosecutors) as being motivated by Romania’s successes in fighting corruption, and a reflection of the efforts made to counter this fight.

Dar, nu e treaba comisiei să-și bată capul (V.B.2.e.97):

It is not the mandate of the Venice Commission within the framework of this opinion to take a view on the above processes and concerns, nor to assess the legal and practical implications of the above – mentioned protocols. It belongs to the different parties involved (specialised parliamentary committees and other bodies with supervising tasks over the activities of intelligence services, but also to judicial institutions, magistrates, judicial council, intelligence services) to establish facts, roles and – probably shared – responsibilities. A thorough review of the legal rules on the control of the intelligence services seems necessary.

Totul este minunat, și, în final, zice la VI.163:

The Venice Commission therefore recommends to Romanian authorities to:
– Re-consider the system for the appointment / dismissal of high-ranking prosecutors, including by revising related provisions of the Constitution, with a view to providing conditions for a neutral and objective appointment / dismissal process by maintaining therole of the institutions, such as the President and the SCM, able to balance the influence of the Minister of Justice;

Una peste alta, Președintele nu poate fi lăsat fără “câini”. Păi se poate, măi, nesimțiților?!

UPDATE

AS are cam aceeași înțelegere.

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